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Abstract 
 
A widely held belief before the 1990s – referred to as the oil-blessing hypothesis – was that oil discovery 
and production should promote economic growth and development, and lead to poverty reduction. 
However, the so-called ‘oil-curse’ hypothesis, postulated by Sachs and Warner in 1995, challenged this 
belief, thus provoking a heated debate on the theme. The oil-curse hypothesis has been traditionally tested 
by means of cross-sectional and panel-data models. We go beyond these traditional methods to test 
whether the presence of spatial effects can alter the hypothesis in oil-producing African countries. In 
particular, the effects on economic growth of oil production, oil resources and oil revenues along with 
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the quality of democratic institutions, investment and openness to trade are investigated. Our findings 
are as follows. First, the validity of the spatial Durbin model is vindicated. Second, consistently with the 
oil-curse hypothesis, oil production, resources, rent and revenues have a negative and generally 
significant effect on economic growth. This result is robust for across the panel data, spatial durbin, and 
spatial autoregressive models, and for different measures of spatial proximity between countries. Third, 
we find that the extent to which the business environment is perceived as benign for investment has a 
positive and marginally effect on economic growth. Additionally, economic growth of a country is 
further stimulated by a spatial proximity of a neighbouring country, if the neighbouring country has 
created strong institutions protecting investments. Fourth, openness to international trade has a positive 
and marginally significant effect on economic growth. However, the significance of the parameter 
estimate is sensitive to the model that is being considered. Overall, the findings suggest that oil-producing 
African economies are cursed by oil discovery, production and revenues rather than by the spatial 
proximity with their neighboring countries. 
Key words :  Oil Curse, Oil Resource Governance, Africa, Spatial Analysis 
 
1 Introduction 
The assumption underpinning classic economic reasoning is that natural resource endowments should be 
the drivers of economic growth, development and poverty reduction. Indeed, natural resources such as 
crude oil, gold and other primary commodity exports are the major means by which countries in their 
early stage of development, such as those in Africa, can generate foreign exchange and promote job 
creation (Auty and Mickell, 1998; Auty, 2001, Ackah et al.,2014, Ackah 2015). In addition, revenue 
from natural resource endowments can be invested in other productive sectors of the economy, such as 
manufacturing, human capital development and agricultural modernization, which can spur per capita 
growth in both the short and the long term. Ross (2012) argues that revenues from oil, a key natural 
resource, have distinctive qualities in terms of scale, stability, source and superiority. These qualities 
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should translate into the growth of the economy by means of job creation in the oil and oil-related 
industries, access to credit by companies, government and individuals, technological transfer from major 
foreign oil companies to local partners, training and capacity building and increased government revenue 
through oil-related taxes and resource rent. 
However, this has not been the case in most oil-producing countries, especially in Africa. Sachs and 
Warner (1995) propose a paradoxical hypothesis that seems to imply that oil abundance puts limits on 
economic growth. This hypothesis stipulates that resource-endowed countries (e.g. Nigeria, Sudan and 
Venezuela) are worse performers than less well-endowed countries, such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea 
(Sachs and Warner, 199, Tiago et al., 2010). Based on Sachs and Warner’s (1995) findings, oil resources 
are therefore a curse rather than a blessing. Moreover Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) posit that the 
inability of resource-rich countries to translate resource wealth into development may be the source of 
the curse. This paradoxical hypothesis suggests a shift from the classic conception of the growth-
enhancing effect of rich natural resource endowments to a growth-inhibiting effect termed the oil curse. 
The purpose of sustainable development is to satisfy the needs of today’s generation whilst taking 
into consideration the needs of future generations and the environment. To achieve this goal, 
Baumgartner and Quaas (2009) recommend that natural resources should be used in three ways. First, 
scarce and non-renewable natural resources can be used in alternative ways to achieve a number of goals. 
For instance, instead of exclusive reliance on oil resources, the economy should be geared towards both 
oil and non-oil natural resources (e.g. agriculture) to enhance sustainability. This calls for diversification 
of the income from natural resources. Second, scarce resources can be used to achieve alternative goals. 
For instance, natural resource revenues can be invested in power production and distribution to enhance 
electricity access which can help minimise rural poverty and rural-urban migration. Finally, scarce 
resources can be used to achieve some other legitimate societal goals such as establishing social or 
economic mitigation funds. 
Cavalcanti et al. (2011) provides a number of reasons for questioning existing models and evidence 
that are used to test the oil curse hypothesis. These models are usually based on the cross-sectional 
regression methodology applied by Sachs and Warner (1995). According to Cavalcanti et al. (2011), 
cross-sectional regression methodology does not take into consideration the time dimension of the data 
and consequently may suffer from endogeneity bias. Moreover, according to Koedijk et al. (2011), the 
few studies that build upon panel data methodology featuring fixed or random effects are plagued by a 
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high degree of homogeneity across the countries under study. Koedijk et al. (2011) suggest that 
homogeneous estimates can exhibit large biases that may provoke wrong inferences and recommend 
heterogeneous estimation.  
Since the 1960s, African countries have mooted the idea of an economic union just like that of the 
European Union. As a result, international institutions such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) have been formed. In addition to the existing trade and cultural relations among African 
countries, there is an assumption that major developments and policies in one country can affect other 
countries. This assumption is empirically validated by Ellison and Glaesar (1997) who find that 
agglomeration or spatial concentration lead to regional socio-economic and technological spill overs. 
These effects arising from the spatial agglomeration of countries have not properly been accounted 
for in previous studies. According to Damette and Seghir (2013), existing studies that have estimated the 
oil curse feature two main weaknesses. First, these models assume the same effect of natural resources 
on economic growth in all countries. As countries have different quantities of reserves, production 
capacity and reliance on oil revenues, this assumption may lead to unreliable estimates. Second, the 
constant effect of natural resources is another widely held assumption in existing studies. In practice, due 
to oil price and production volatility, the amounts of oil revenues differ from period to period. Third, 
regional studies, especially those that are based on neoclassical thought, assume that the economy is 
closed (Solow, 1956). However, the use of regional data opens up the possibility that the variables are 
not independent due to the interconnectedness of contiguous countries (Anselin, 1988). If such 
interconnections are not factored into the modelling, bias and inefficient estimates may arise (Buccellato, 
2007). Indeed, there is evidence of cross-border contagion (Easterly and Levines, 1998). 
In particular, the growth of one country and its policy choices affects the growth and policy choices 
of other countries. While improving policies alone boosts growth substantially, the growth effects are 
larger if contiguous countries act together in international institutions such as ECOWAS and the AU. As 
the related literature on the growth–resource abundance nexus has rarely examined these geographic 
effects, this study seeks to test jointly the spatial effect and the neighbouring effect on the oil curse 
hypothesis. In this study, these weaknesses are taken into consideration by using a spatial panel data 
model. The spatial econometric model has three main advantages over traditional econometric methods 
(Paelinck and Klaassen, 1979; Anselin, 2003): i) the formal specification of spatial effects in an 
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econometric model; ii) the use of diagnostic tests to examine the presence of spatial dependence or 
heterogeneity; iii) the ability to interpolate or predict spatial effects. The contribution of this study is 
threefold. First, the study estimates whether there is spatial dependence between the observations by 
taking into consideration the location of the data measured in space. The second contribution is to 
ascertain whether there is spatial heterogeneity among the variables and how this affects the oil revenue–
economic growth nexus. Finally, cross-country heterogeneity and the time variability of the relationship 
between oil revenues and economic growth determinants are also major components of the model. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Several methodologies have been developed to test the oil and natural resource curse hypothesis. 
For instance, Matsuyama (1992) applies the linkage approach to study the natural resource curse. He 
concludes that factors that push the labour force from the manufacturing sector to the primary sector slow 
economic growth. This is because the learning-induced positive effects in manufacturing that enhance 
productivity are reduced. In contrast, Sachs and Warner (1999) argue that such an approach is applicable 
to primary sectors such as agriculture and not the oil sector. As a remedy for the apparent deficiencies of 
Matsuyama’s (1992) approach, Sachs and Warner (1995) decompose the linkage into the tradable natural 
resource sector, the tradable non-natural resource sector and the non-tradable sector. They find that the 
greater the natural resource endowment, the greater the demand for non-tradable goods and the lesser the 
capital and labour allocation to the manufacturing sector. This implies that oil endowment slows 
industrial growth. 
Extending the oil curse debate, Collier (2008) argues that the oil curse can be explained by factors 
other than resource abundancies, such as institutional quality, lack of skilled managers and labourers for 
resource governance, geographic location and other regional factors. These make the analyses of spatial 
effects within the relationship between oil revenues and economic growth relevant in reaching a valid 
conclusion. Table 1 shows a summary of studies on the relationship between oil revenues and economic 
growth. 
 
Table 1. Summary of works on the oil curse hypothesis 
Author  Methodology Period Finding 
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Sachs and Warner 
(1995) 
OLS 1970–
1989 
Economies with high amounts of natural 
resources tend to have slow growth 
Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003) 
OLS 1980–
1995 
Confirms the oil curse hypothesis 
Kronenberg (2004) Stepwise regression 1989–
1999 
Confirms the oil curse hypothesis 
Brunnschweiler 
(2008) 
Two-stage least 
squares 
1970–
2000 
Oil abundance promotes economic 
growth 
Alexeev and Conrad 
(2009) 
  Abundance of oil and other natural 
resources have a positive impact on 
economic growth 
Mehrara (2009) Panel fixed effects 1965–
2005 
Growth rate of oil revenues beyond the 
18% threshold has a negative impact on 
economic growth 
Cavalcanti et al 
(2011) 
Panel analysis 1980–
2006  
Oil abundance affects growth positively 
Fan et al (2012) Functional co-
efficient model 
1997–
2005 
Resource abundance has a positive effect 
on cities 
Cotet and Tsui 
(2013) 
Dynamic panel 
models 
1970–
2000 
Stable and positive relationship between 
oil abundance and long-term economic 
growth 
Yaduma et al (2013) GMM 1980–
2007 
Evidence of oil curse in non-OECD 
countries 
 
A cursory look at the literature on the oil resource-economic growth nexus indicates a lack of consensus 
on the oil curse hypothesis. First, the findings in the literature are far from conclusive. Whilst a strand of 
the literature shows that oil resources have a positive effect on growth, other research provides evidence 
to the contrary. This necessitates the application of a new and rigorous methodology. Second, although 
Sachs and Warner (1997) suggest that geographical influence may be able partially to explain the oil 
curse hypothesis, Fan et al.(2012)’s study is perhaps the only one that seeks to evaluate the role of spatial 
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dynamics on the oil curse hypothesis. However, Fan et al. (2012) study centres on China and examines 
how the distance between cities influences natural resource management. Unlike Fan et al. (2012), this 
study examines the cross-country effect and the impact of economic distance on how oil resources have 
contributed to growth in Africa. Agnew and Corbridge (1989) indicate that the concept of spatiality can 
be taken to imply the effect of geographical entities such as distance, districts, regions and structural and 
economic concepts (e.g. trade) on economic growth. Furthermore, Herbert- Burns (2012) posits that the 
concept of space (spatial attributes) is relevant to the study of oil resource management. 
In a nutshell, for the purpose of effective testing, measurability and to contribute to literature, 4 
hypothesis are proposed: 
i. Benign business environment of oil producing countries have spatial spill over effects on 
neighbouring oil producing countries. 
ii. Oil revenues, oil production and oil revenues have positive effect on economic growth in oil 
producing African countries 
iii. The method applied (cross-sectional, panel or spatial panel method) does not alter the findings 
on  relationship between oil resources and economic growth  
iv. Quality institutions have significant relationship with economic growth in oil producing 
African countries 
 
 
 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data 
This study uses a standard cross-sectional approach, with panel data and spatial econometrics to study 
the oil resource–economic growth nexus. The time dimension consists of annual data spanning a period 
of 26 years, from 1985 to 2011. The cross-section of countries is dictated by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) in terms of countries that have been producing oil over the sample period. These include 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, the Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria 
and Sudan. According to the IEA (2012), there are 19 oil-producing countries in Africa. In this study, 
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only countries for which oil production data have consistently been recorded from 1985 are considered. 
Out of these countries, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola and Libya are the major producers. According to the 
EIA (2013), Africa’s oil reserves have grown by 120% in the last 30 years, from 57 billion in 1980 to 
USD 124 billion barrels in 2012. In 2010, Africa contributed 12.4% of global crude oil production 
(KPMG, 2013). 
Africa’s growth has been punctuated by social and economic tensions, conflicts, corruption and 
global economic events (AEO, 2013). Despite these challenges, Africa recorded a growth rate of 6.6% 
in 2012, dropping to 4.8% in 2013 and projected to be 5.3% in 2014. This growth has principally been 
driven by high prices of commodities such as oil. Similar to the studies of Sachs and Warner (1995) and 
Yaduma et al (2013), this research uses vital determinants of economic growth, including trade openness, 
oil revenues and investment, as well as governance indicators, such as corruption and institutional 
quality. Institutional quality is proxied by the polity index. It is assumed that the oil curse is more 
pronounced in countries with poor institutional frameworks than in countries with quality institutions 
(Boschini et al. 2007). Indeed, investment in productive sectors and rent-seeking activities compete for 
oil revenues in countries with poor institutions. According to Mehlum et al. (2006), the prudent 
management of oil revenues in Norway and the US can be attributed to well-defined property rights and 
good quality and transparent institutions. On the other hand, dysfunctional institutions which promote 
rent-seeking behaviour have been cited as a key cause of poor management of oil revenues in Nigeria 
and Venezuela (Lane and Tornell, 1999). 
Following the work of Yaduma et al. (2013), the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP 
is used to measure trade openness. Yaduma et al. (2013) argue that trade opens an economy to the outside 
world and serves as a channel for technological transfer, which boosts economic growth. Other variables 
that are considered in the study include investment, computed as domestic investment as a percentage of 
GDP. Again, energy consumption, which has been found to be a major driver of industrialization (Stern, 
2003) is included as a predictor of growth. Due to lack of complete data, Libya and Equatorial Guinea 
are excluded from this study. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observation Mean St. Dev. Minimum  Maximum 
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GDP 270 3.42e+10 3.42e+10 4.10e+09 1.66e+11 
GDPpc 270 1952.26 1804.753 201.7319 7710.144 
OP 270 4.226834 0.41752 3.017353 5.187351 
Inv 270 19.0248   8.152736     2.1 52.93884 
En 270 639.7167   304.3034  230.2079   1644.835 
Oilrent 270 20.29743   19.78108   0.0673111  75.70786 
Oilrev 270 6.51e+09   1.35e+10   7062706 1.25e+11 
Oilreserv 270 4.635273   7.453701      0 37.2 
GDPpc85 270 2067.11   2000.221   589.869  7710.144 
Polity 270 6.67037   3.80943      1 15 
Notes: GDP is real GDP, GDPpc is real GDP per capita, OP is oil production, Inv is investment, En is 
energy consumption, Oilrent is oil rent, Oilrev is oil revenues, Oilreserv is oil reserves and Polity is a 
proxy for institutional quality. The estimation period is 1985 to 2011. The countries used in this study 
are Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, the Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, 
Nigeria and Sudan. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars. Oil producing countries such as 
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Sudan were exempted because there were no continuous data on 
some of the variables used in this study. 
Time series plots of oil revenues and GDP are provided in Fig. 1. Interestingly, most African countries 
seem to be diversifying since the relative share of oil revenue in GDP is low in almost all countries 
except in Angola, Gabon and Nigeria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Time series plot of Oil Revenues and GDP  
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Time series plots of oil revenues and GDP in oil-producing African countries. Notes: this figure depicts 
time series plots of renewable energy consumption of 9 oil-producing African countries. The sample 
period runs from 1985 to 2011 for 9 countries (Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Côte d׳Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria, and Tunisia). Renewable energy consumption is 
measured in current US dollars). 
 
 
Four different measurements of oil abundance are used in this paper. The first is oil production in 
thousand barrels per day, the second is oil revenues in current US dollars, the third is oil rent in current 
US dollars and the final indicator is oil reserves in billion barrels. All the oil abundance indicators are 
obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Polity, a proxy for institutional quality, 
draws on Yaduma et al (2013), who also define institutional quality in a similar manner. According to 
Lane and Tornell (1999) and Mehlum et al. (2006), the difference between highly performing oil-
producing countries, such as Norway, and under-performing oil-producing countries, like Nigeria and 
Cameroun, can be attributed to institutional quality. Indeed institutions with poor quality enhance rent-
seeking and revenue-grabbing behaviour. Polity takes on values ranging from one to ten, with the lowest 
values indicating countries with institutions of low quality. The data are obtained from the Polity IV 
project of the Centre for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), which is 
similar to the data used by Wagner (2011) to measure institutional quality. Consistent with the resource 
abundance–growth nexus literature, other factors include energy use (measured in kilograms per oil 
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equivalent per capita), trade openness (a ratio of export and imports in current US dollars) and investment 
(in current US dollars). Please see appendix A for the definition of the variables. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
Spatial econometric methods have gained prominence in economics for two main reasons (Anselin, 
2001). The first is the desire to apply theoretical economic models that explicitly account for the 
interaction between an economic agent and other heterogeneous agents in a system. Indeed, these models 
consider factors such as neighbourhood effects, social norms, economic groupings and peer group effects 
and capture how individual interactions can lead to aggregate patterns. For instance, there is spatial 
correlation when a variable of interest (per capita growth) in location A is determined by the values of 
the same variable in location B. The second driver is the need to handle spatial data when there is spatial 
autocorrelation which cannot be captured by standard econometric methods. This paper investigates the 
presence of spatial effects by studying the spatial heterogeneity and the spatial correlation between per 
capita oil revenues and per capita economic growth. The study draws on the augmented Solow growth 
model suggested by Mankiw et al. (1992) and Easterly and Levine (1998) in a spatial panel analysis. As 
oil is traded on the international market, oil price shocks and other factors related to oil revenue 
management in one country can affect the growth of a neighbouring country. An example is given by the 
oil exploration issues involving Nigeria and Cameroon, where litigation concerning maritime border 
challenges has affected the oil output of both countries (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003). Another factor may 
be the effect of conflicts in one oil-producing country, such as Nigeria, on the growth of another, such as 
Cameroon. A case in point is the Boko Haram threat in Northern Nigeria which is affecting oil operations 
in Chad and Cameroon. This makes spatial panel data analysis suitable for this study as it captures the 
effect of shocks to per capita income growth of one country on the growth of another country. 
According to Anselin (2001), the most common form of spatial econometric model is one that relates 
the value of a  random variable in a given location (A) to its values in another location (B). This implies 
that a random variable is indexed to location j: 
 
 , jjy D  (1) 
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where D is a set of discrete locations or a continuous surface. As each random variable is assumed to be 
influenced by location, the spatial correlation can then be specified as: 
 
 cov , , .j i j i j iy y E y y E y E y              (2)  
 
where j i ; j and i are the individual locations; ,j iy y  are the values of a random variable at locations j 
and i. Anselin (2001) suggests that the covariance can be estimated in three fundamental ways. First, a 
functional form can be estimated based on equation (1) so that the covariance structure can follow. 
Second, the covariance structure can be estimated directly as a function of selected parameters. Finally, 
the spatial equation can be modelled non-parametrically by leaving the covariance structure unspecified. 
Taking an 1N   vector of random variables, y, observed across space and an 1N   vector of 
independent and identically distributed (iid) random errors  , the spatial stochastic model is derived as 
follows: 
 
   y i W y i         (3) 
 
where   is the mean of y, i  is an 1N   vector of ones, whilst  is the spatial autoregressive parameter. 
W is the spatial weight matrix, which depends on the definition of neighbourhood for each observation. 
The spatial weight matrix can then be defined as: 
 
 
1....,
.ij jj
j N
Wy w y

    (4) 
 
To estimate the determinants of economic growth in oil-producing African countries, GDP can be 
expressed as a function of the predictors defined in Table 2. This will allow the estimation of the cross 
section and the panel methods before the spatial variables are introduced. 
The empirical model is specified as: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5t t T t t t t t t tgdp gdp oilrent inv en open polity                          (5) 
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Oil rent, oil production, oil revenues and oil reserves are entered in turn separately in the equation. 
In addition,   is an unobservable country effect, t  is an unobservable time effect that is common to all 
countries and t  is an unobservable component that varies over time and country and is assumed to be 
uncorrelated. According to Madariaga and Poncent (2007), the introduction of a lagged dependent 
variable and country-specific effects in Equation (5) may render the OLS estimator biased and 
inconsistent. 
To analyse the stability of the parameter estimates, we also estimate Equation (5) by replacing oil 
production with oil revenues, oil rent, oil reserves and energy use. In addition, we estimate the cross-
sectional equation without an oil abundance variable. The specific indicators of institutional quality are 
the investment risk profile (the higher the value, the lower the perceived risk of investment) and the 
corruption index with a higher value indicating higher levels of corruption. Moreover, we estimate the 
panel data model without the measure of openness to trade. The estimation results for the panel method 
are summarized in Tables 4 (𝑶𝒊,𝒕 = oil production), 5 (𝑶𝒊,𝒕 = oil revenues), 6 (𝑶𝒊,𝒕 = oil rent) and 7 (𝑶𝒊,𝒕 = 
oil reserves).  
However, ignoring the spatial effects could also lead to misspecification and invalid inference. The 
spatial effects equation can be expressed as: 
 
y Wy X       (6)
   
where y is a vector of observations for the dependent variable,   is a spatial autoregressive that takes 
the values -1 and 1, x is an n x k matrix of k exogenous variables, whilst   is the element of vector 
coefficients and   is an n element of vector of errors. The Moran-I test (Moran, 1950) is used to detect 
spatial dependence among the variables. In addition in order to minimise the impact of the Modifiable 
Area Unit Problem (MAUP), alternative zoning systems were applied during the aggregation of the 
spatial units. If, for instance, the test shows evidence of spatial dependence for oil rent and income, 
Equation (7) is augmented to include the spatial dependence variables, as follows: 
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4. Estimation Results 
In Section 4.1, the estimation results from a standard cross-sectional model that draws on Sachs and 
Warner (1995) are analysed. In Section 4.2, the results of a standard panel-data model with cross-
sectional and time fixed effects are estimated and discussed. Section 4.3 summarizes and analyses the 
results of the spatial Durbin model (SDM) and the spatial autoregressive model (SAR). 
 
4.1. Cross-sectional estimation 
Using a cross-sectional estimation method à la Sachs and Warner (1995), we test the growth effects of 
oil abundance. The results is presented in table 3 
 
Table 7.3. Cross-sectional estimation, real GDPpc growth as the dependent variable 
Variable (0) (2) (4) (6) (7) (8) 
GDPpc85 -0.0102* 0.0120* -0.0219* -0.0120* -0.0123* -0.0104* 
Inv 0.0245* 0.0292*    0.0203* 0.0292* 0.0302* 0.0259*  
Oilrev  0.0011*     
Oilrent   0.0080*    
OP     0.0011*                 
Oilreserv 0.0012*      
En      0.0003   
N 270 270 270 270 270 270 
R2 0.2197 0.2552     0.5054     0.2575     0.2650     0.2217   
Notes: * p<.01; ** p<.05; *** p<.10 
 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the cross-sectional model. The effect of economic growth per capita of 
1985 (GDPpc85), investments (Inv), oil revenues (Oilrev), oil rents (Oilrent), oil production (OP), oil 
reserves (Oilreserv) and energy consumption (En) on economic growth in oil-producing African 
countries from 1985 to 2011 is estimated. The countries used are Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, 
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the Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan. Table 3 indicates that the 
logarithm of initial real GDP per capita has the expected negative and significant effect on the average 
growth rate of real GDP per capita. The effect size is also stable across the six equations, except for the 
equation that features oil rent. Therefore, consistent with classic growth theory, poorer countries show a 
tendency initially to catch up with richer countries.  
The average investment share in GDP has the expected positive and significant effect on the average 
growth rate of real GDP per capita. The effect magnitude is stable across the six equations. Therefore, 
higher proportional investment as a share of GDP is associated with greater economic growth. This calls 
for investments especially in the productive sectors of the economy such as power generation to stimulate 
economic growth. 
Next, the oil abundance variable has a positive and significant effect, except for the equation 
featuring energy use. This result initially suggests that in oil-exporting African countries the resource 
blessing prevails. The coefficient of determination 𝑹𝟐 ranges from 22% (the equation without an oil 
abundance variable) to 51% (the equation featuring oil rent as an oil abundance variable).  
This notwithstanding, the disadvantages of the cross-sectional method has been highlighted by a 
number of studies. According to Cavalcanti et al. (2011), the cross-sectional regression methodology 
does not take into consideration the time dimension of the data and, consequently, may suffer from 
endogeneity bias. Further, there is difficulty in making causal inference and the results may be different 
if another time-frame is used (Bland, 2001). Based on these limitations, a robust method that takes into 
consideration the time and geographic dimensions is used in this study. 
 
4.2. Panel data estimation 
We next estimate a panel-data model that features cross-sectional and time-period specific effects to test 
for the growth effects of oil abundance.  
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Table 4. Panel estimation with country-specific and time-specific fixed effects 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
gdp 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26          0.26 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.21 
lrinv1 0.0083 0.008 0.008 0.0086 0.0085 0.01 0.008 0.0063 0.009 0.08 0.081 0.008 0.0081 0.0080 0.0084 0.08 0.006 
oilprod -0.002 -0.002 -0.02 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.02 -.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.02 -0.03 
open  0.006 0.006 0.0059 0.0068 0.006 0.007 0.0089 0.006 0.06 0.008 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.02 -0.03 
polity    -0.003         0.004 0.01 0.01 0.007 0.012 
corrupt     0.0036            -0.06 
govstab      -0.001           -0.03 
soccon       0.001          0.0028 
invprof                                   0.004 0.004 
intconfl         0.01        0.003 
extconfl          -0.1       -0.02 
milpol           0.03      0.002 
relpol            -0.01     -0.03 
law             -0.003    -0.82 
ethten              -0.001   -0.64 
demacc               -0.001  -0.09 
burqua                0.04 0.029 
En -0.12 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 -0.16 -0.144 -0.16 -0.19 -0.17 -0.2 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.144 -0.11 -0.1 -0.1 
N 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
R2 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.469 0.47 0.47 0.468 0.469 0.4688 0.467 0.47 0.49 
 
Notes: Table 4 presents the results of the panel estimation for oil-producing African countries. Real GDP in current US dollars per 
capita is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the lag value of GDP (gdp), investment share of GDP (inv) in 
current US dollars, trade openness (open) in current US dollars, oil production (op) in thousands of barrels per day and energy 
consumption (en) in kilotonnes per oil equivalent. In addition to these, several governance variables were used to proxy for good 
19 
 
 
governance, benign business climate, transparency and accountability. These variables are used interchangeably. The governance 
variables include polity, which proxies institutional quality with values ranging from 0 to 10, corruption (corrupt), government 
stability (govstab) with values ranging from 1 to 10, socioeconomic conditions (soccon) with values ranging from 0 to 10, 
investment profile (invprof) with values ranging from 0 to 12, internal conflicts (intconfl) with values ranging from 1 to 12, external 
conflicts (extconfl) with values ranging from 1to 12, religion in politics (relpol) with values ranging from 0 to 6, law and order 
(law) with values ranging from 0 to 6, bureaucracy quality (burqua) with values ranging from 0 to 6, military in politics (milpol) 
with values ranging from 0 to 6 and ethnic tensions (ethten) with values ranging from 0 to 6. Ten oil-producing African countries, 
namely Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria and Tunisia, are included 
in the analysis.  
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Tables 4 to 7 present the results of the panel estimations. The choice of panel fixed-effects methods was 
informed by the results of the Hausman tests. However, Clark and Linzer (2012) argue that the Hausman 
test is not a sufficient metric for deciding between fixed- and random-effects models. The best metrics 
are the size of the dataset, the level of correlation between the covariate and unit effects and the extent 
of within-unit variation between the dependent and the explanatory variables (Clark and Linzer, 2012). 
In a large dataset with a high number of observations, the fixed-effects model produces unbiased 
estimates (Gelman and Hill, 2007). Therefore, this paper draws on the Hausman test and the high number 
of observations to establish the use of the fixed-effects model. 
Four different equations are estimated with oil production, oil reserves, oil revenues and oil rents 
respectively. The results shown in Table 4 indicate that oil production has an inverse relationship with 
economic growth in all the equations estimated. Although previous studies, such as Barnett and Ossowski 
(2002), have used oil revenues as a proxy for oil abundance, this finding has potential policy implications. 
Oil production has both positive and negative effects on economic growth. First, the beginning of 
commercial production can offer the oil-producing country the opportunity to access the financial market 
as the country becomes attractive for foreign direct investments (Ross, 2012). However, oil production 
also has disadvantages. First, Matsuyama (2002) finds that oil production attracts labour from the other 
sectors of the economy and reduces productivity in these sectors. For instance, universities start 
introducing petroleum-related courses and radio and television discussions begin to centre on crude oil 
production. This affects the growth of non-oil sectors, which reduces the overall economic performance 
of the country. Second, oil production becomes the central focus of every major economic policy to the 
disadvantage of the other sectors of the economy. For example, the contribution of the agricultural sector 
to Ghana’s GDP before oil production was 31% in 2008. After three years of oil production, the 
agricultural sector contributed less than 20%. Nigeria, once a cocoa and coffee producer, has insignificant 
cocoa trees after more than 50 years of oil production. As the growth rates of other sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing diminish without a corresponding increase in the contribution of oil to 
growth, the economic performance of the country suffers. The study finds that on average, any 1% 
increase in oil production reduces economic growth by 0.0021%. This calls for policies that ensure 
balanced investment in oil production and other sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture to boost 
economic growth. The results further reveal that the investment profile of an oil-producing country has 
a positive effect on economic growth. According to the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the 
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investment profile is the sum of all the factors that affect the risk of investments which are not covered 
by political, economic and financial risk sections. This includes contract viability/expropriation, profit 
repatriation and payment delays. According to Table 4, any 1% increase in the investment profile 
increases economic growth by 0.0038%. This implies that the promptness with which contracts are paid 
and the extent to which they are transparent have a positive effect on economic growth. Therefore, oil-
producing African countries should encourage disclosure of information on beneficial ownership and 
contract details and laws on profit repatriation regulations should be published to improve their 
investment profile.  
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Table 5. Panel estimation with country-specific and time-specific fixed effects  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
gdp 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27                0.27 0.26  0.24  0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.21   
inv  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
oilrev -0.002 -.002 -.002    -.002    -.002 -.002 -.002    -.003 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002    -.002    -.002 -0.02 -.002  -.003 
open 
 
.006 .006 .006 .007 0.0063 0.0068 0.0089 0.0058 0.0062 0.0077 0.0055 0.0045 0.006 0.0064 0.0066 0.0117 
polity 
   
-.004 
            
-.001 
corrupt 
    
.004 
           
.005 
govstab 
     
-0.009 
          
-0.003 
soccon  
      
0.0014 
         
0.0026 
invprof 
       
0.0036 
        
0.0039 
intconfl  
        
0.0015 
       
0.0032 
extconfl 
         
-0.006 
      
-0.019 
milpol  
          
0.0033 
     
0.0021 
relpol 
           
-0.001 
    
-0.031 
law  
            
-0.032 
   
-0.081 
ethten 
             
-0.014 
  
-0.064 
demacc 
              
-0.008 
 
-0.008 
burqua 
               
0.0044 0.0031 
en -0.108 -0.100 -0.100 -0.138 -0.179 -0.127 -0.144 -0.142 -0.148 -0.131 -0.148 -0.132 -0.122 -0.092 -0.101 -0.111 -0.095 
N 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
R2 0.467 0.4674 0.4674 0.4677 0.4687 0.4676 0.4681 0.4746 0.469 0.4675 0.47 0.4677 0.4685 0.4677 0.4675 0.4693 0.4913 
 
Notes: Table 5 presents the results of the panel estimation for oil-producing African countries. Real GDP in current US dollars per 
capita is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the lagged value of GDP (gdp), the investment share of GDP (inv) 
in current US dollars, trade openness (openness) in current US dollars, oil revenues (oilrev) in current US dollars and energy 
consumption (en) in kilotonnes per oil equivalent. In addition to these, several governance variables were used to proxy good 
governance, benign business climate, transparency and accountability. These variables are used interchangeably. The governance 
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variables include polity, which proxies institutional quality with values ranging from 0 to 10, corruption (corrupt), government 
stability (govstab) with values ranging from 1 to 10, socioeconomic conditions (soccon) with values ranging from 0 to 10, 
investment profile (invprof) with values ranging from 0 to 12, internal conflicts (intconfl) with values ranging from 1 to 12, external 
conflicts (extconfl) with values ranging from 1to 12, religion in politics (relpol) with values ranging from 0 to 6, law and order 
(law) with values ranging from 0 to 6, bureaucracy quality (burqua) with values ranging from 0 to 6, the military in politics (milpol) 
with values ranging from 0 to 6 and ethnic tensions (ethten) with values ranging from 0 to 6. Ten oil-producing African countries, 
namely Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria and Tunisia, are used in 
this analysis.  
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Table 5 shows the results for the determinants of economic growth in oil-producing African countries. 
In this section, the results for the impact of oil revenues, governance variables and energy 
consumption on economic growth are presented. Consistent with the findings of Sachs and Warner 
(1995), Gyfalson (2001), Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) and Yaduma et al. (2013), there is an inverse 
relationship between economic growth and oil revenues in oil-producing African countries.  Lane 
and Tornell (1996) attribute this to excessive rent-seeking behaviour, corruption and weak 
institutions, which they term ‘voracity effects’. This notwithstanding, two circumstances can explain 
this finding. First, as oil revenues are seen as ‘given by nature’, citizens’ demand for accountability 
are not as strong as in the case of tax revenues. This creates incentives for the diversion of funds and 
rent-seeking behaviour on the part of various interest groups. Second, oil revenues are cyclical due 
to the volatile nature of oil prices. Therefore, projects that are started using oil revenues when there 
is a boom are left to decay when there is bust. This leads to waste and inefficiency, both of which 
affect growth negatively. Furthermore, the results reveal that the investment profile has a significant 
and positive impact on economic growth. 
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Table 6. Panel estimation with country-specific and time-specific fixed effects  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
gdp 0.3 0.27 0.29 0.287 0.282 0.286 0.291    0.275 0.265 0.283 0.277 0.288 0.289 0.287  0.287 0.277 0.233 
inv  .01 0.014 0.014 0.0138 0.0132 0.0134 0.014 0.0132 0.0142 0.0137 0.0136 0.014 0.0139 0.0139 0.0137 0.0135 0.011 
oilrent -0.1 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 0.003 -0.001 -0.023 -0.005 0.0006 -0.006 0.0005 -0.045 -0.019 -0.017 -0.015 -0.001 -0.037 
open 
 
0.0049 0.0049 0.005 0.0057 0.0043 0.0045 0.0061 0.0044 0.0038 0.0062 0.0052 0.004 0.005 0.0043 0.0053 0.0068 
polity 
   
0.002 
            
0.0004 
corrupt 
    
0.0086 
          
0.0101   
govstab 
     
0.0011 
          
-.0011 
 soccon  
      
-0.011 
         
0.001 
invprof 
       
0.0021 
        
0.0014 
intconfl  
        
0.0031 
       
0.0048 
extconfl 
         
0.0018 
      
0.001 
milpol  
          
0.0034 
     
0.0013 
relpol 
           
-0.018 
    
-0.071 
law  
            
-0.022 
   
-0.046 
ethten 
             
-0.0002 
  
-0.006 
demacc 
              
0.0012 
 
0.0013 
burqua 
               
0.005 0.0063 
en  -0.2 -0.233 -0.233 -0.169 -0.246 -0.203 -0.202 -0.245    -0.234 -0.229 -0.222 -0.215 -0.155 -0.165 -0.23 -0.193 -0.194 
N 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
R2 0.4 0.4451 0.4451 0.4452 0.4517 0.4455 0.4456 0.4475 0.4475 0.4466 0.4478 0.4458 0.4456 0.4451 0.4453 0.4474 0.4745 
 
Notes: Table 6 presents the results of the panel estimation for oil-producing African countries. Real GDP in current US dollars per 
capita is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the lagged value of GDP (gdp), investment share of GDP (inv) in 
current US dollars, trade openness (openness) in current US dollars, oil rent (rsoilrent1) in current US dollars and energy 
consumption (en) in kilotonnes per oil equivalent. In addition to these, several governance variables were used to proxy good 
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governance, benign business climate, transparency and accountability. These variables are used interchangeably. The governance 
variables include polity, which proxies for institutional quality with values ranging from 0 to 10, corruption (corrupt), government 
stability (govstab) with values ranging from 1 to 10, socioeconomic conditions (soccon) with values ranging from 0 to 10, 
investment profile (invprof) with values ranging from 0 to 12, internal conflicts (intconfl) with values ranging from 1 to 12, external 
conflicts (extconfl) with values ranging from 1to 12, religion in politics (relpol) with values ranging from 0 to 6, law and order 
(law) with values ranging from 0 to 6, bureaucracy quality (burqua) with values ranging from 0 to 6, the military in politics (milpol) 
with values ranging from 0 to 6 and ethnic tensions (ethten) with values ranging from 0 to 6. Ten oil-producing African countries, 
namely Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria and Tunisia, are used in 
this analysis.  
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The oil rent measures the contribution of oil to GDP according to the World Bank Development 
Indicators. The a priori expectation was that oil rent and economic growth should be inversely related as 
oil revenues are volatile and suffers from the voracity effect. Consistent with this assumption, oil rent 
and economic growth are inversely related. However, unlike the other indicators of oil resources, oil 
rents are not significant at 5% confidence level.  
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Table 7 Panel estimation with country-specific and time-specific fixed effects (real GDPpc growth as the dependent variable) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
gdp 0.26 0.26   0.26 0.26 0.265    0.264 0.259  0.2416 0.257  0.2645    0.2567   0.2634      0.268    0.264   0.264    0.255  0.212  
inv  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.006 0.0088 0.0081 0.0079 0.0081 0.008 0.008 0.0082 0.0078 0.0054 
oilreserv -.02    -.02 -.02 -.24    -.02 -.02    -.03  -0.0027    -0.0022    -0.0024    0.0023    -0.0024      -0.0024   -0.24    -0.24    -0.0023    -0.0030  
open 
 
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.0092 0.006 0.0064 0.0079 0.0058 0.0047 0.0061 0.0064 0.0069 0.012 
polity 
   
-.04 
            
-0.0006 
corrupt 
    
.004 
           
0.0048 
govstab 
     
-0.01 
          
-0.003 
soccon  
      
.015 
         
0.0026 
invprof 
       
0.004 
        
0.004   
intconfl  
        
0.0014 
       
0.0028 
extconfl 
         
-0.0007 
      
-0.0021 
milpol  
          
0.0032 
     
0.0018 
relpol 
           
-0.0008 
    
-0.0025 
law  
            
-0.0032 
   
-0.0082 
ethten 
             
-0.009 
  
-0.0058 
demacc 
              
-0.005 
 
-0.0004 
burqua 
               
0.0049 0.0037 
En  -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.156 -0.1404 -0.1482 -0.137 -0.1238 -0.1345 0.1042 -0.1146 -0.1048 
N 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 
R2 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.4774 0.4707 0.4695 0.4719 0.4695 0.4704 0.4695 0.4694 0.4717 0.4935 
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Notes: Table 7 presents the results of the panel estimation for oil-producing African countries. Real GDP in current US dollars per capita is the 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the lagged value of GDP (gdp), investment share of GDP (inv) in current US dollars, trade 
openness (openness) in current US dollars, oil reserves (oilreserv) in billion barrels, and energy consumption (end) in kilotonnes per oil equivalent. 
In addition to these, several governance variables were used to proxy good governance, benign business climate, transparency and accountability. 
These variables are used interchangeably. The governance variables include polity, which proxies institutional quality with values ranging from 0 
to 10, corruption (corrupt), government stability (govstab) with values ranging from 1 to 10, socioeconomic conditions (soccon) with values 
ranging from 0 to 10, investment profile (invprof) with values ranging from 0 to 12, internal conflicts (intconfl) with values ranging from 1 to 12, 
external conflicts (extconfl) with values ranging from 1to 12, religion in politics (relpol) with values ranging from 0 to 6, law and order (law) with 
values ranging from 0 to 6, bureaucracy quality (burqua) with values ranging from 0 to 6, the military in politics (milpol) with values ranging from 
0 to 6 and ethnic tensions (ethten) with values ranging from 0 to 6. Ten oil-producing African countries, namely Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, 
Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria and Tunisia, are used in this analysis.  
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Finally, Table 7 presents the results of the ‘oil reserve’ equation. According to Stijns (2005), 
natural resource reserves have had an inverse relationship with economic growth since the 
1970s. As reserves represent a future revenue stream, policy makers may be tempted to spend 
more today and pay with the production of the reserves tomorrow. Another explanation for the 
inverse relationship between economic growth and reserves is ‘feeding frenzy’.  Lane and 
Tornell (1996) argue that the discovery of natural resources leads to a fight for control and 
spending between competing factions, which leads to inefficiency, this being termed a ‘feeding 
frenzy’. Without any long-term planning or accountability in institutions, such spending can 
lead to waste and corruption, thereby affecting growth negatively. Table 8 reveals this trend 
and supports Stijns’ (2005) assertion that reserves generally have a negative impact on growth. 
Furthermore, and consistent with other findings, the investment profile of the countries has a 
positive impact on economic growth. 
 
4.3 Spatial model 
To examine the effect of geographic and economic proximity on economic growth, a spatial 
econometric model is employed in the third section of the analysis. The first two sections 
applied a cross-sectional method and a panel method respectively. The results of these two 
estimations confirm that oil revenues, oil reserves, oil production and oil rent have an inverse 
relationship with economic growth. Furthermore, in three out of the four models of the panel 
estimation, the investment profile is found to have a significant and positive effect on economic 
growth. In section 4.3, the results of the spatial econometrics are discussed. 
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Table 8. Spatial Durbin model (SDM) 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Main gdp. 0.291 0.278 0.278 0.256 0.267 0.263 0.253 0.282 0.264 0.273 0.277 0.281 0.280 0.277 0.274 0.179 
 
Inv 0.0115 0.009 0.011 0.0082 0.0092 0.0083 0.0068 0.0093 0.0084 0.009 0.0089 0.0088 0.0088 0.0089 0.0091 0.0036 
 
oilprod -0.0025 -0.0021 -0.0028 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0022 0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.002 -0.0022 -0.003 
 
openness 
 
0.017 0.0217 0.0147 0.017 0.0189 0.0192 0.0142 0.0196 0.0196 0.0167 0.0146 0.0152 0.0165 0.0182 0.0199 
 
polity 
  
-0.0014 
            
-0.0002 
 
corrupt 
   
0.0003 
           
-0.0013 
 
govstab 
    
-0.0003 
          
-0.0041 
 
soccon 
     
0.0007 
         
0.0028 
 
invprof 
      
0.003 
        
0.0033 
 
intconfl 
       
0.0023 
       
0.005 
 
extconfl 
        
0.0189 
      
-0.0034 
 
milpol 
         
-0.0005 
     
0.0014 
 
relpol 
          
0.003 
    
-0.0003 
 
law 
           
-0.0008 
   
-0.0085 
 
ethten 
            
-0.0022 
  
-0.0033 
 
demacc 
             
-0.0009 
 
-0.0055 
 
En 
              
0.0002 0.0121 
                  
                  
wx lrinv1 -0.0132 -0.0171 -0.0141 -0.0159 -0.0149 -0.0169 -0.015 -0.0207 -0.0205 -0.0168 -0.0169 0.0162 -0.0194 -0.0165 -0.0172 -0.0398 
 
lroilprod1 -0.0013 0.0019 -0.0011 0.0029 0.0034 0.0045 0.0026 0.0021 0.0014 0.0025 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0022 0.001 -0.0012 
 
openness 
 
0.0849 0.112 0.0857 0.0934 0.0937 0.0768 0.055 0.1023 0.0906 0.0846 0.0833 0.078 0.0889 0.0821 0.1113 
 
polity 
  
-0.0047 
  
-0.0087 
         
-0.003 
 
corrupt 
   
-0.0179 
           
-0.0425 
 
govstab 
    
0.0026 
          
-0.005 
 
soccon 
     
0.0087 
         
-0.005 
 
invprof 
      
-0.0009 
        
0.0036 
 
intconfl 
       
0.0085 
       
0.0286 
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extconfl 
        
-0.0044 
      
-0.013 
 
milpol 
         
-0.0036 
     
-0.0084 
 
relpol 
               
0.0153 
 
law 
           
0.0045 
   
-0.0254 
 
ethten 
            
0.0147 
  
0.0418 
 
demacc 
             
-0.0018 
 
-0.043 
 
En 
              
0.0034 0.0402 
                  
 
rho 0.1974 0.112 0.0355 0.0593 0.0782 0.1133 0.1236 0.081 0.0844 0.1108 0.1127 0.1076 0.0884 0.1103 0.1138 0.2418 
 
Variance 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0016 
Direct. Inv 0.0117 0.0093 0.0116 0.0087 0.0096 0.0087 0.0072 0.0097 0.0088 0.0094 0.0093 0.0092 0.0092 0.0093 0.0095 0.0055 
 oilprod -0.0025 -0.0020 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0033 
 
openness 
 
0.0187 0.0222 0.0156 0.018 0.0206 0.0205 0.0149 0.0201 0.0212 0.0182 0.0159 0.0162 0.018 0.0197 0.0166 
 
polity 
  
-0.0012 
            
0.0001 
 
corrupt 
   
0.0012 
           
0.0008 
 
govstab 
    
0.0002 
          
-0.004 
 
soccon 
     
0.001 
         
0.0029 
 
invprof 
      
0.0036 
        
0.0029 
 
intconfl 
       
0.0028 
       
0.0041 
 
extconfl 
        
 
      
-0.0027 
 
milpol 
         
0.0035 
     
0.0012 
 
relpol 
          
-0.0002 
    
-0.001 
 
law 
           
-0.0011 
   
-0.0089 
 
ethten 
            
0.0001 
  
-0.0035 
 
demacc 
             
0.0009 
 
-0.0047 
 
burqua 
              
0.0046 0.011 
Indirect. Inv -0.0139 -0.0162 -0.0127 -0.0146 -0.0133 -0.0158 -0.0138 -0.0197 -0.0193 -0.0155 -0.0158 -0.0144 -0.0186 -0.0155 -0.0161 -0.0354 
 
oilprod -0.0021 0.0025 -0.0011 0.003 0.0036 0.0048 0.0027 0.0021 0.0014 0.0028 0.002 0.0022 0.0019 0.0023 0.0009 0.0005 
 
openness 
 
0.1009 0.1118 0.0877 0.0976 0.105 0.0847 0.0554 0.1078 0.1027 0.0935 0.0892 0.0821 0.0989 0.0913 0.0901 
 
polity 
  
-0.005 
            
-0.002 
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corrupt 
   
-0.0200 
           
-0.0348 
 
govstab 
    
0.0023 
          
-0.0029 
 
soccon 
     
-0.0102 
         
-0.0058 
 
invprof 
      
-0.0009 
        
0.0018 
 
intconfl 
       
0.009 
       
0.0234 
 
extconfl 
        
-0.0049 
      
-0.0102 
 
milpol 
         
-0.0057 
     
-0.0091 
 
relpol 
          
-0.0004 
    
0.0116 
 
law 
           
0.0052 
   
-0.0212 
 
ethten 
            
0.0147 
  
0.0377 
 
demacc 
             
-0.0032 
 
-0.0343 
 
burqua 
              
0.0031 0.0289 
Total lrinv1 0.002 -0.0069 -0.0011 -0.0059 -0.0037 -0.0071 -0.0067 -0.0099 -0.0105 -0.0061 -0.0066 -0.0052 -0.0094 -0.0062 -0.0066 -0.029 
 
oilprod -0.0046 0.0005 -0.0038 0.0015 0.0017 0.003 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0008 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0028 
 
openness 
 
0.1195 0.1341 0.1033 0.1156 0.1255 0.105 0.0702 0.1280 0.124 0.112 0.1051 0.0984 0.1169 0.111 0.107 
 
polity 
  
-0.0062 
            
-0.0018 
 
corrupt 
   
-0.0188 
           
-0.0340 
 
govstab 
    
0.0025 
          
-0.0069 
 
soccon 
     
-0.0093 
         
-0.0029 
 
invprof 
      
0.0027 
        
0.0048 
 
intconfl 
       
-0.0119 
       
0.0275 
 
extconfl 
        
-0.005 
      
-0.0129 
 
milpol 
         
-0.0022 
     
-0.0079 
 
relpol 
          
-0.0006 
    
0.0106 
 
law 
           
0.0041 
   
-0.0301 
 
ethten 
            
0.0148 
  
0.0342 
 
demacc 
             
-0.0023 
 
-0.039 
 
burqua 
              
0.0077 0.04 
 
N 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 25 0.2747 
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R2 0.2735 0.3181 0.3114 0.3255 0.319 0.3036 0.3179 0.3216 0.3177 0.3045 0.3191 0.3208 0.3141 0.3182 0.316 0.2979 
 
Notes: Table 8 presents the results of the panel estimation for oil-producing African countries. Real GDP in current US dollars per capita is the 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the lagged value of GDP (growthL1), investment share of GDP (Inv) in current US dollars, trade 
openness (openness) in current US dollars, oil production (OP) in thousands of barrels per day and energy consumption (en) in kilotonnes per oil 
equivalent. In addition to these, several governance variables were used to proxy good governance, benign business climate, transparency and 
accountability. These variables are used interchangeably. The governance variables include polity, which proxies for institutional quality with 
values ranging from 0 to 10, corruption (corrupt), government stability (govstab) with values ranging from 1 to 10, socioeconomic conditions 
(soccon) with values ranging from 0 to 10, investment profile (invprof) with values ranging from 0 to 12, internal conflicts (intconfl) with values 
ranging from 1 to 12, external conflicts (extconfl) with values ranging from 1to 12, religion in politics (relpol) with values ranging from 0 to 6, 
law and order (law) with values ranging from 0 to 6, bureaucracy quality (burqua) with values ranging from 0 to 6, the military in politics (milpol) 
with values ranging from 0 to 6 and ethnic tensions (ethten) with values ranging from 0 to 6. Ten oil-producing African countries, namely Algeria, 
Angola, Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria and Tunisia, are used in this analysis.  Significant variables 
are in bold letters. 
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An attempt is made to examine the spatial dynamics between oil resources (production, 
reserves, rent and revenues) and economic growth in oil-producing African countries. The 
results indicate that the parameter ‘rho’ is statistically significant in all equations of the spatial 
Durbin model (SDM) and the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model. This indicates that if a 
country grows, it positively affects the growth of its neighbours. Therefore, the spatial 
autoregressive effect is positive and significant. This finding is relevant to regional bodies such 
as the African Union and ECOWAS in initiating regional policies that improve economic 
growth in both regional and individual countries. Regarding the geographical effects on the 
relationship between oil resources and economic growth, the study finds no evidence that the 
proximity of countries has an impact on oil revenue management. This finding implies that 
‘bad company’ does not necessarily corrupt good character but rather the actions and inactions 
of individual oil-producing countries affect the economic growth–oil resource management 
nexus. This finding therefore confirms the assertion by Sachs and Warner (2001) that 
geographical influence on the resource curse hypothesis may be insignificant..  
Furthermore, the spatial effect of trade openness is positive but is significant only in some 
equations. The effect is not robust across different measures of oil variables and different 
models. Thus, there is some evidence that if a country is open to international trade, its 
neighbouring countries are likely to grow faster, but it is rather weak. Yanikkaya (2003) finds 
that developing economies should benefit from trade among themselves, especially when the 
trade encourages technical transfer. However, he argues that the impact of trade openness on 
economic growth is not straightforward and that trade barriers have relatively higher impact on 
economic growth when the country has a comparative advantage.  
Consistent with the oil curse literature, corruption is found to be detrimental to economic 
growth in some of the models. This is because corruption diverts revenues into personal 
accounts that would otherwise have been used for development. Mo (2001) argues that one of 
the main channels in which corruption affects economic growth negatively is political 
instability. 
Finally, the study also finds that lower risk of investment or a better investment 
environment have a positive and direct effect on economic growth and also a spatial effect. 
This implies that if the risk of investment deteriorates in a neighbouring country, this is likely 
to stifle the economic growth of other countries around it.  
 
36 
 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The effect of oil revenues and oil abundance on economic growth in oil-producing African 
countries is examined in this paper by considering the spatial dynamics of this relationship. In 
particular, the effects on economic growth of oil production, oil resources and oil revenues, 
together with the quality of democratic institutions, investment and openness to trade, are 
investigated. The findings are as follows. First, the validity of the spatial Durbin model is 
vindicated. Second, consistent with the oil curse hypothesis, oil production, resources, rent and 
revenues have a negative and generally significant effect on economic growth. This result is 
robust across the panel data, spatial Durbin and spatial autoregressive models and for different 
measures of spatial proximity between countries. Third, the extent to which the business 
environment is perceived as benign for investment has a positive, albeit marginal, effect on 
economic growth. In addition, the economic growth of a country is further stimulated by spatial 
proximity to a neighbouring country if the neighbouring country has created strong institutions 
protecting investments. Fourth, openness to international trade has a positive and marginally 
significant effect on economic growth. However, the significance of the parameter estimate is 
sensitive to the model that is being considered.  
Overall, the findings suggest that oil-producing African economies are cursed by oil 
discovery, production and revenues, rather than by the spatial proximity to their neighbouring 
countries. These findings have four main policy implications. First, oil-producing African 
countries should do more to translate oil production and oil revenues into sustainable economic 
development. This can be done by adapting any of three practical models. The first is the 
Norwegian model. Norway invested in domestic infrastructure and human capital development 
in the initial stages of its oil production. Later, it created a Sovereign Wealth Fund and now 
spends only the interest accruing to the fund. The second model is Indonesia’s agricultural 
modernization. Indonesia invested much of its oil revenues in modernizing agriculture to boost 
food production, reduce food imports and create jobs, especially in rural areas. Finally, 
Malaysia’s diversification model ensures that oil revenues are invested in small and medium-
scale enterprises and also invests in ways that help to create an enabling business environment. 
These models call for capital investment at the expense of spending on goods and services. 
Second, regional institutions, such as ECOWAS, AU and the African Development Bank, 
should help member countries to implement strategies and policies that create a benign 
investment climate. This stems from the finding that a better investment climate has a positive 
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and spatial effect on economic growth. This can be done by enforcing the implementation of 
treaties such as the Abuja Declaration, which called for high investment in agriculture, and the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development, which focuses more on trade, regional integration 
and human capital development. 
Third, international trade has been identified as one of the main drivers of growth in this 
study. Oil-producing African countries should therefore engage in value-added trade with other 
African countries and the international community to promote job creation and economic 
growth. 
Fourth, with investment profile as a leading driver of economic growth, countries should 
create an enabling business environment by minimizing the process of establishing businesses, 
enforcing contracts and publishing beneficial ownership information, encouraging 
transparency and accountability in awarding oil production contracts and managing oil 
revenues. 
Finally, the non-oil sector should be given considerable attention. This has three 
advantages: (i) the non-oil sector will become the anchor of the economy when oil productions 
peak and start diminishing; (ii) it will minimize the impact of oil price fluctuations on the 
economy and help build stability to stem volatility; (iii) as the opportunity of creating more 
jobs in the oil sector is minimal due to the capital-intensive nature of the sector, investing in 
the non-oil sector can take up labour to reduce unemployment. 
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